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Here it is, Sunday morning. Something in the structure of the
situation makes me think it must be my role to counter Mark Tush-
net's message of despair with the message of hope-and to wrestle with
Alan Freeman for the soul of Paul Brest.
The problem posed to us by Professor Tushnet is the failure of
contemporary legal scholarship, as he sees it, to participate signif-
icantly in what he takes to be the one true intellectual calling of
our times: coming to terms with the demon of subjectivity in hu-
man inquiry, both descriptive and normative.
One, and I think the less interesting, of Professor Tushnet's ex-
planatory theses is that legal scholars are, by and large, the same
people as law professors. That is, we are people whose job it is to
teach advocates, and in whose teaching role subjectivity-the insu-
perable partiality of learned discourse-is not a problem, but a premise.
That observation may help explain the marginality of some legal
scholarship. I doubt, though, that it reflects, as Professor Tushnet
suggests it does, the demand for "professionalism" in legal education.
Every teacher here knows there is no logical inconsistency, nor even
(for the teacher) any serious dissonance, involved in trying to show
students how legal arguments are made, and how they are made per-
suasive, while trying at the same time to show students (if that is
one's line) that legal arguments necessarily lack logical compulsion
or any other kind of objective validity. The last lesson, if true, is
obviously one that every professionally competent lawyer ought to
understand. Thus, law teaching that overlooks the problem of judi-
cial and other legal subjectivity is not necessitated by the "dilemmas
of professional education in an academic setting";1 it is simply in-
adequate teaching. It is not, then, "in their role as teachers of lawyers"
that legal scholars are blocked (insofar as they are blocked) from in-
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volvement in contemporary intellectual life as Professor Tushnet
conceives it.
I do not, of course, mean to deny what Professor Kronman said
in his introductory remarks: that advocacy may be habit-forming and
may atrophy the faculty of more detached appraisal.3 Nor do I mean
to deny the existence of pressures that may deflect law teachers from
teaching and scholarship that seriously confront the issue of sub-
jectivity in legal ordering. The notion of the rule of law is, as Pro-
fessor Tushnet says, a crucial component of our society's prevailing
ideas about the legitimacy of democratic political institutions. The
rule of law is also a part of the liberal solution to the dilemmas of
individuality and society, of freedom and order-to what Professor
Tushnet, speaking at the level of theory, calls "the conflict between
objectivity and subjectivity." 4 He is, furthermore, correct to state that
"the conflict between objectivity and subjectivity cannot readily be
confronted within the legal sphere" in ways that do not undermine
the rule of law.3 It is a plausible hypothesis that there are, as a re-
sult, ideological pressures on law teachers to steer clear of thought
or utterance that threatens the sense of legitimacy by confounding
the rule of law. Certainly that hypothesis is one upon which each
of us can reflect and to which each of us can try to respond out of
our own experience. What we as educators should be clear about is
that such pressures as there may be arise not out of any canon of
"professionalism" in legal education, but out of law's crucial position
in liberal political thought. Professor Tushnet's first explanation of
the alleged depravity of legal scholarship is strictly parasitic on his
second.
The second explanation, in a nutshell, is that legal scholarship suf-
fers from its flight from Realism, its refusal to accept the Wittgen-
steinian critique of rules, its inability to rise above the liberal fancy
that "human behavior can be governed by rules that have some supra-
individual content" that enables them somehow to "reconcile sub-
jectivity and objectivity." The bane of legal scholarship, according
to this diagnosis, is the notion of the rule of law.
Speaking very roughly, we can say that the liberal rule-of-law so-
lution to the dilemma of subjectivity and objectivity in political life
requires both a lawmaking process that conforms to liberal norms
3. See Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J.
955, 964-65 (1981).
4. Tushnet, supra note 1. at 1206.
5. Id. at 1207 (emphasis added).
6. Id. at 1207, 1222.
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of individuality-of equality and consent-and a resulting corpus juris
capable of impartially resolving all disputes that may arise. That is
not, to be sure, a simple prescription to fill. Of the many compli-
cations that might be noted, one cluster deserves special mention
here: there is little chance than any corpus juris will be sufficiently
complete and detailed to resolve particular disputes without some ex-
ercise of lawmaking authority by the adjudicative tribunal itself; but
it is unclear either how such exercises of authority could be objec-
tively certified as impartial or how a constitutional system that al-
lows for them could be found to conform to norms of equality and
consent. The answers to these problems are not, to use Professor
Tushnet's adverb, "readily" available. I cannot see, however, how
it follows that searching for answers is a misguided, an arid, or an
intellectually marginal enterprise.
We might dwell for just a moment on the problem of the liberal
constitution. How should one specify the basic norms of individuality
and equality? By what mode of discourse-utilitarian, contractarian,
"neutral dialogue," or something else? What constitution will satisfy
the basic norms? Scholarship addressed to those questions of liberal
political theory is hardly beside the point of the subjective-objective
dilemma. Is it, even so, doomed to intellectual marginality? Is Rawls
an intellectually marginal figure? Is Nozick? (It is too soon to ask,
is Ackerman?)
It may be true that these days it is not primarily lawyers, but non-
lawyer philosophers, economists, and political scientists, who are do-
ing basic liberal constitutional theory; and surely it is true that 'twas
not ever thus. Perhaps, then, there is something that tends to confine
contemporary legal scholarship to the edge of town. If so, however,
it seems to me on the evidence so far adduced that, whatever the
something is, liberal ideology ain't it.
It might be said that lawyers qua lawyers do their distinctive thing
at the level of applying the law to cases. Is it not clear, the argu-
ment would go, that, at that level, the liberal mystification of the
Rule of Law blocks scholars from life-giving engagement with the
issue of subjectivity? I see little reason to think so.
Professor Tushnet mentions Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investi-
gations7 as the "fancy citation" for the idea that rules and rule sys-
tems are ineradicably indeterminate." It is worth remembering just
7. L. WrITTENsTEiN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (3d ed. G. Anscombe trans. 1973).
8. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1217 n.51.
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what lessons Wittgenstein taught. From Wittgenstein we learned that
a set of instructions can never finish explaining how itself is to be
read; the signpost on the road fails to tell us whether to go in the
direction of the point or the butt. The Wittgensteinian lesson, how-
ever, does not end there. It goes on to insist that judgments of error,
mistake, and incompetency in the use of rules are nonetheless pos-
sible within a practice, a language-game, or a form of life. One can
say, for example, that a traveler striking off in the direction of the
butt-end of a road sign has failed to read the sign correctly.
The latter part of the lesson has implications for liberal legal
theory no less significant than those of the first part. At the very
least, it seems to mean that in no case is the set of admissible ju-
dicial responses-decisions and reasons-unbounded. It may mean, fur-
ther, that there are at least some "easy cases" in which the set of
admissible responses contains only one member.
No doubt those observations alone are not enough to salvage lib-
eral legalism from Realist attack, but neither are they irrelevant.
They leave open a number of avenues for scholarship to follow: What
degree of "openness," if any, can a liberal legal order tolerate with-
out losing its legitimacy on liberal premises such as those of equality
and consent? What modes of criticism of judicial judgment are avail-
able? How sharply can criticism reduce the population of hard cases
and narrow the set of admissible decisions and reasons? What are
the alternatives? Granting that a liberal legal order does entail for
each of us a partial surrender to judicial authority figures of our
own innate authority to determine the law for ourselves, are there
alternatives that are better or more just? And, again, what is the
meta-theory for dealing with that question?
All of those questions, and more, invite inquiry within a liberal
"paradigm"; all are addressed to the subjective-objective dilemma;
all may yet lead in directions and to legal and political ideas yet
undreamed. Who is to say not?
There may be something deeply, morally wrong with the funda-
mental liberal commitment to the separate life of the individual. I
cannot quite bring myself to think so (there you have my confes-
sion for this Sunday morning), but there may be. For scholars who
think otherwise-for whom that liberal commitment to separate in-
dividuality is a considered and chosen commitment-what choice is
there but to wrestle with the demon of subjectivity on liberal turf
and on liberal terms? The point I insist on is that one can do that:
liberalism as such is not an intellectual contrivance for repressing
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the problem of subjectivity from consciousness; it is a way of fram-
ing and posing the problem.
Let me end by recalling Paul Brest's paper, which in many ways
overlaps with Mark Tushnet's. The quest recounted in Paul's paper
sounded to me like a liberal quest, the pilgrim like a liberal pil-
grim, the grail like a liberal's grail. Who but a liberal would care
that there may not be a "substantive value-neutral non-originalist
mode of constitutional adjudication"? 9
-Paul's discourse was precisely about the problem of subjectivity in
law. For aught any listener could tell it was conducted entirely on
liberal premises. The vision evoked towards its end, of a participa-
tory public dialogue leading to the development of shared values out
of individuals' thoughts and utterances, is, to my understanding, not
antithetical to a reasonably ample liberalism but continuous with an
important branch of the liberal tradition-the one spoken for by
Arendt in On Revolution ° and, I believe, by Kant in the Ground-
work:1' it is the Kantian vision of the Kingdom of Ends.
I think the issue comes down to this: intellectual cowardice-in-
cluding not least the refusal to face honestly the problem of subjec-
tivity in law-is a vice; but the name of the vice is "cowardice," not
"liberalism." We have to hope it is given to some, sometimes, to
rise above scholarly original sin. Granted that necessary if perhaps
forlorn premise, I do not see that anything has been said to show
that liberal hopes are especially incompatible with scholarly grace.
9. Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Norma-
tive Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981).
10. H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1965).
11. I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE MErAPHYSICS OF MoRAts (H. Paton trans. 1947).
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